Redistribution by Means of Lotteries by Gauthier, Stéphane & Laroque, Guy
Redistribution by Means of Lotteries
Ste´phane Gauthier, Guy Laroque
To cite this version:
Ste´phane Gauthier, Guy Laroque. Redistribution by Means of Lotteries. Documents de travail
du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2015.05 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2015. <hal-01158155>
HAL Id: hal-01158155
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01158155
Submitted on 29 May 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redistribution by Means of Lotteries 
 
Stéphane GAUTHIER, Guy LAROQUE 
 
2015.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
Redistribution by Means of Lotteries∗
Stéphane Gauthier† and Guy Laroque ‡
January 19, 2015
Abstract
A government designs transfers to agents in the absence of information on their
preferences. The second-best allocation is equal sharing among citizens when the
awards are deterministic. We provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which
lotteries improve upon the egalitarian outcome. The condition requires that the cit-
izens with large social weights have low risk aversion, and that the left tail of the
distribution of risk aversion be suﬃciently dispersed.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: H21, H23, H26.
Keywords: Lerner egalitarianism, random redistribution, incentives, qualiﬁed con-
straints.
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1 Introduction
Premium Bonds have been introduced in 1956 by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold
Macmillan to promote saving in the UK. These bonds combine a riskless principal with
additional prizes paid randomly. Every ¿1 face value bond has a small equal chance of
winning a price ranging from ¿25 to ¿1m each month. Holders can cash their bonds at
their ¿1 face value at any time. The lottery is very popular in the UK: around 23 million
individuals hold Premium Bonds, and it is particularly appealing to low income families
(Tufano (2008)). Similar lottery-linked saving programs also exist in other developed and
developing countries (Guillén and Tschoegl (2002)). The aim of our paper is to discuss
the eﬃciency and equity of such programs. Low income families beneﬁt from non negative
expected income transfers but they also suﬀer from randomness, all the more as they
are risk averse. At ﬁrst sight welfare losses seem useless and they could be avoided by
removing the noise component, e.g., by appealing to the Income Bonds that closely resemble
Premium Bonds but pay the risk-free interest. There is an extensive literature which
discusses eﬃciency and equity of lotteries and other forms of gambling as means of raising
funds, e.g., raes, pari-mutuel raes or lotto. Lotteries are usually found dominated by
other (deterministic) tax instruments. Morgan (2000) provides a synthesis of this literature
and advocates lotteries in the case of public good provision by private charities lacking tax
power. The particular feature of the Premium Bonds lottery is to involve non negative gain
whatever the outcome of the lottery.
Similar issues arise in other circumstances, e.g., the organization of conscription dis-
cussed in (Sabin (2008)) or the allocation of health care treatments. The conscription can
indeed be combined with a commutation tax, or with the possibility given to the young
men called for duty to ﬁnd a substitute. The wealthier citizens then pay to avoid the risk
associated with war which are born by the less well-oﬀ part of the population. As in the
case of Premium Bonds, the outcome is to transfer some income toward the poorest and/or
less risk averse individuals who are exposed to risk. An health agency may face a similar
problem when allocating new medical treatments that involve more risk but higher gains
in life expectancy.
In these examples an authority chooses to expose a part of the population to a situa-
tion which entails more risk but higher expected gains. It is known that in a second-best
world a principal may ﬁnd it valuable to design a random contract to the agents (Laﬀont
and Martimort (2002)). Risk sometimes relaxes the incentive constraints when second-best
considerations result from asymmetric information. Typically one expects randomization
to be rare, and the literature provides many context-speciﬁc conditions ensuring that a
deterministic optimum cannot be improved upon using randomization. However little is
known about general conditions for useful/useless randomization. In Gauthier and Laroque
(2014) we give a necessary and suﬃcient condition for local randomization around a deter-
ministic optimum to yield no welfare improvement, but our previous analysis only applies
to well-behaved problems where the constraints in the deterministic program are qualiﬁed.
In the examples discussed above, the qualiﬁcation requirement fails to hold: if the
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government is committed to use only deterministic programs, and if it cannot observe the
actual saving capacity of the household, the actual opportunity cost of conscription, or
the actual health status, then every agent will pretend to have the characteristics which
yield the unique best outcome. Only the risk-free bonds will be bought, and no additional
saving will be made. All the young men will try to avoid war by pretending to have high
opportunity costs associated with conscription, and patients will ask for the sure treatment
giving the highest gain in life expectancy. In the absence of noise, no screening is possible
and all the agents have to be treated symmetrically. Such situations are particular instances
of a general redistribution problem identiﬁed by Lerner (1944). Consider a government
trying to allocate in a deterministic fashion a given sum of money, and potential income
recipients with diﬀerent income valuations. If valuation is not observed by the government,
and recipients always value more income than less income, then only an equal sharing of
the resources is feasible.
A random allocation may allow the planner to sort individuals by their attitudes toward
risk. Randomization induces individuals to reveal private information that can be used by
the planner to achieve better outcomes, e.g., to distribute more resources to those who have
a larger social weight. Indeed Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky (2002) present a number of
examples of economies where this phenomenon occurs. Some of these examples involve large
departures from the Lerner egalitarian allocation, others are restricted to small deviations
from the Lerner outcome. Following the latter, our paper studies the possibility of a second
best improving local randomization.
We provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of random locally
improving stochastic allocations in the Lerner setup. As in the work of Pestieau, Possen,
and Slutsky (2002), this condition requires that society favors individuals with a low risk
aversion: it is then possible to transfer to these agents the average tax obtained from high
risk aversion individuals. Such transfers must be allocated randomly so that the individuals
with a low social value do not apply. Our necessary and suﬃcient condition generalizes
this basic insight and shows that random redistribution is socially useful when the average
social value of the high risk aversion individuals is low and the dispersion of risk aversion
at the bottom of the distribution is high enough.
This result calls for creating lotteries with positive expected gain when there is a negative
correlation between social weights and risk aversions. Individuals with a high risk aversion
would pay for not entering these lotteries. The experimental results reported in Lobe and
Hölzl (2007) suggest that low income families involved in the Premium Bonds lottery indeed
have lower risk aversion than the richest.
2 Deterministic redistribution
A social planner has to allocate a total ﬁxed income y to individuals who diﬀer in their
utilities for income. There is a continuum of individuals with total unit mass. The utility of
a type θ individual is u(y, θ) when her income is y, y ∈ R+. The parameter θ is distributed
on a closed rectangle Θ of a ﬁnite dimensional space, with a positive continuous probability
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density function f (·), and cumulative distribution function F (·). Utility is twice contin-
uously diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave in income: u′y(y, θ) > 0 and u
′′
yy(y, θ) < 0 for
all y and θ.
Each individual is supposed to know her own type. In the ﬁrst-best the social planner
also observes this type and allocates y∗(θ) to each type θ individual. The proﬁle (y∗(θ))
maximizes1 ∫
Θ
u(y(θ), θ) dF (θ) (1)
subject to the feasibility constraint ∫
Θ
y(θ) dF (θ) ≤ y. (2)
The ﬁrst-best optimum (y∗(θ)) is characterized by (2) at equality and the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions u′y(y
∗(θ), θ) = u′y(y
∗(θˆ), θˆ) for all θ and θˆ. In general heterogeneity in utility implies
an unequal division of income.
The implementation of this solution crucially requires that the planner observes agents'
types. As Lerner (1944) acknowledges, in the absence of public information on types,
`[· · · ] every individual could declare that he has exceptionally high capacities for
satisfaction and so should be given more income than anybody else if total satisfaction
is to be maximized. [· · · ] If it is impossible, on any division of income, to discover
which of any two individuals has a higher marginal utility of income, the probable
value of total satisfactions is maximized by dividing income evenly.' (Lerner (1944),
chapter 3, page 28-29)
Indeed, when the social planner no longer observes the individual types, the optimal
income distribution maximizes (1) subject to (2) and the incentive constraints
u(y(θ), θ) ≥ u(y(θˆ), θ) for all θ and θˆ.
Since utility is increasing in income, these constraints are satisﬁed if and only if y(θ) = y(θˆ)
for all θ and θˆ. The feasibility constraint then gives the only allocation consistent with all
the constraints,
y(θ) = y for all θ. (3)
In a Lerner economy, incentive constraints yield income equalization independently of the
social redistributive tastes. This is the Lerner (deterministic second-best) optimum.
1To alleviate notations, we write ∫
Θ
dF (θ)
for ∫ θsup1
θinf1
· · ·
∫ θsupn
θinfn
f(θ) dθ1 · · · dθn.
4
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3 Random redistribution
We now extend the powers of the planner and allow for randomized redistribution. Suppose
that the planner can design a menu of lotteries, such that every individual must choose
a lottery from the menu. Given the random (positive or negative) draw from the lottery,
there is commitment both from the government and the players to conform to the outcome.
Suppose also that a law of large number holds, so that with independent draws the cost
of the lottery in feasibility terms is equal to its mathematical expectation. Then an astute
design of the set of available lotteries may lead the members of the society ex ante to reveal
their types.
We look for a menu of lotteries (y˜(θ)) that improves upon the reference Lerner optimum,∫
Θ
E[u(y + y˜(θ), θ)] dF (θ) >
∫
Θ
u(y, θ) dF (θ) (4)
subject to the feasibility constraint∫
Θ
E[y˜(θ)] dF (θ) = 0, (5)
and the incentive constraints
E[u(y + y˜(θ), θ)] ≥ E [u(y + y˜(θˆ), θ)] for all θ and θˆ. (6)
The lotteries y˜(θ) that we shall consider are small, meaning that their support are
contained in a ball around the origin. The mean and the variance of a typical lottery are
m ≡ E[y˜] and v ≡ var [y˜]. In the Lerner optimum, y˜(θ) = m(θ) = v(θ) = 0 for all θ. Let
r(θ) = −u
′′
yy(y, θ)
u′y(y, θ)
be the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of a type θ individual evaluated at the Lerner
outcome. Also let α(θ) ≡ u′y(y, θ) denote the marginal social weight of a type θ individual.
In the sequel, the weights are normalized so that their total sum in the population is 1,∫
Θ
α(θ)dF (θ) = 1.
Lemma 1. Consider a family of menus y˜λ(θ), θ ∈ Θ, with mean variance (λm(θ), λv(θ)),
for λ in the interval [0, 1]. Suppose that they satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
(6). Consider two types θ1 and θ2 with r(θ1) < r(θ2). For λ small enough, the incentive
constraints imply
v(θ1) ≥ v(θ2),
5
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m(θ1) ≥ m(θ2)
and
m(θ1)− r(θ1)
2
v(θ1) ≥ m(θ2)− r(θ2)
2
v(θ2).
If m and v are continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to some component t of θ in a
neigbourhood of θ1, then
∂m(θ1)
∂t
=
r(θ1)
2
∂v(θ1)
∂t
.
Proof. A second order development of individual utility yields
E[u(y + y˜λ(θ), θ)] = u(y, θ) +u′y(y, θ)λm(θ) +
1
2
u′′yy(y, θ)
[
(λm(θ))2 + λv(θ)
]
+E
[
λ2oθ(y˜
2
θ)
]
,
which can be rewritten as
E[u(y + y˜λ(θ), θ)] = u(y, θ) + u′y(y, θ)λ
[
m(θ)− r(θ)
2
(
λm(θ)2 + v(θ)
)]
+ E
[
λ2oθ(y˜
2
θ)
]
.
The incentive constraint of the θ1 type then is
m(θ1)−m(θ2) ≥ r(θ1)
2
[λm(θ1)
2 + v(θ1)− λm(θ2)2 − v(θ2)] + E
[
λ2o(y˜2)
]
. (7)
Adding up with that of the θ2 individual yields
0 ≥ (r(θ1)− r(θ2))
[
λm(θ1)
2 + v(θ1)− λm(θ2)2 − v(θ2)
]
+ E
[
λo(y˜2)
]
.
Letting λ tend towards zero gives the ﬁrst inequality. Again letting λ tend to zero in (7)
implies m(θ1) ≥ m(θ2) and proves the second inequality of the lemma. Finally, to prove
the third inequality, note that (7) at the limit when λ tends to zero,
m(θ1)− r(θ1)
2
v(θ1) ≥ m(θ2)− r(θ1)
2
v(θ2),
gives
m(θ1)− r(θ1)
2
v(θ1) ≥ m(θ2)− r(θ2)
2
v(θ2)
since r(θ1) < r(θ2).
Finally, to prove the ﬁnal assertion of the Lemma, ﬁx t1, take two sequences of t2
converging to t1, one from above, the other from below, and get the derivatives in the limit
by dividing through by t2 − t1.

The incentive constraints imply that the types who display a higher risk aversion at
the Lerner outcome face lotteries with both lower mean and lower variance, and also get
6
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a lower expected utility. Any redistribution of welfare toward risk averse individuals by
means of lotteries is not incentive compatible.
From Lemma 1, it follows that to any menu satisfying (4), (5) and (6) one can associate
an improving menu such that the allocation of the individual with the largest risk aversion
rsup ≡ max r(θ) is non random: one can just reduce uniformly the variances of all the
lotteries in the original menu by v(rsup).
While the Lerner program and its formalization are rather speciﬁc, there are a number of
analogous situations where random contracts and selection according to risk aversion may
be used by the government. Below we sketch the three examples discussed in Introduction.
Example 1. A State is involved in a war and needs to select a given number n of citizens who
will ﬁght. Conscription is associated with a commutation tax. Citizens diﬀer according to
their incomes and their attitudes towards military enrollment summarized by (y, θ), which
are private information. The State proposes two options. The ﬁrst is to go to war. Soldiers
are exposed to the risk of ﬁghting with its associated lottery of monetary compensations y˜0.
The second option is to avoid the risk of ﬁghting while paying for the war a deterministic
income y1. A citizen (y, θ) chooses to go to war if and only if
E[u(y + y˜0, θ)] ≥ u(y − y1, θ).
Let W be the set of (y, θ) such that this inequality is satisﬁed, with measure F (W ). The
reform is feasible if it satisﬁes the budget constraint
F (W )E[y˜0]− (1− F (W ))y1 ≤ 0.
The contribution to welfare is∫
W
E[u(y + y˜0, θ)]dF (y, θ) +
∫
W
E[u(y − y1, θ)]dF (y, θ) > 0.
In addition the army must be large enough, F (W ) ≥ n. 
Example 2. The problem is to allocate health treatments. The outcome is life expectancy,
measured by y. The parameter θ can be thought of as an initial health status. The
health agency proposes a collection of treatments. Treatment t has a random impact on
life expectancy measured by y˜(t). New advanced treatments yield a higher increase in
the expected life expectancy, but greater uncertainty relatively to some benchmark widely
used treatment. The expected utility of a type θ patient when she receives treatment t is
E[u(y˜(t), θ)]. The `small noise' case considered in Lemma 1 can be viewed as a situation
where the new treatments are small incremental innovations with respect to the benchmark.
The government chooses a proﬁle of treatments (t(θ)). Incentive constraints require that
E[u(y˜(t(θ)), θ)] ≥ E
[
u(y˜(t(θˆ)), θ)
]
7
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for all θ and θˆ. From the government viewpoint, the individual utility is scaled by a factor
α(θ), so that the second best program looks for (t(θ)) that maximizes∫
Θ
α(θ)E[u(y˜(t(θ)), θ)] dF (θ)
subject to a budget constraint and possibly technological constraints. 
Example 3. The practical situation that looks the closest to our setup is the UK institution
of the Premium Bonds which involve non negative random income transfers. Every bond
has a face value of one pound. They are not tradable. A ﬁxed number of prizes are
available, two monthly prizes of one million pounds and many smaller prizes. The prizes
are randomly allocated by a lottery. Let ρ˜(n) be the return when the owner has n bonds,
n > 0. The expected utility of a trader with other (privately known) saving s yielding the
riskless interest ρ, is Eu(ρ(s − n) + nρ˜(n)). Let n(s) be the number of premium bonds
designed for an individual with saving s, s ∈ R, the budget of the National Savings and
Investments administration writes∫
s∈R
(ρ− Eρ˜(n(s)))n(s) dF (s) ≥ 0.
This coincides with our setup by setting y˜(s) = (ρ− ρ˜(n(s)))n(s). 
4 A simple reform
This section provides a suﬃcient condition for random redistribution to locally dominate
the Lerner optimum. The menu is made of only two lotteries. The ﬁrst y˜ has mathematical
expectation m and variance v, a strictly positive number. The second in fact is certain,
with mathematical expectation m. The agents who prefer the ﬁrst lottery have a type θ in
Θ˜ = {θ | E [u(y + y˜, θ)] ≥ u(y +m, θ)} .
For the small lotteries considered in Lemma 1 we have
E[u(y + y˜, θ)− u(y, θ)] ' α(θ)
[
m− r(θ)
2
v
]
and
u(y +m, θ)− u(y, θ) ' α(θ)m.
Therefore the set Θ˜ actually comprises the types θ such that r(θ) ≤ r∗ where
m = m− r
∗
2
v. (8)
8
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Let G(r) be the proportion of agents with risk aversion less than r at the Lerner opti-
mum. With a slight abuse of notation, let also α(r) be such that∫
θ|r(θ)=r
α(θ) dF (θ) = α(r) dG(r).
The change in social welfare associated with this menu of lotteries∫
Θ˜
α(θ)E[u(y + y˜, θ)] dF (θ) +
∫
Θ\Θ˜
α(θ)u(y +m, θ) dF (θ)−
∫
Θ
α(θ)u(y, θ) dF (θ) (9)
is approximately
r∗∫
rinf
α(r)
(
m− r
2
v
)
dG(r) +m
rsup∫
r∗
α(r) dG(r).
Using the feasibility constraint,
G(r∗)m+ [1−G(r∗)]m = 0,
and the deﬁnition of the threshold r∗ given in (8) we get
m = −G(r∗)r
∗
2
v and m = [1−G(r∗)]r
∗
2
v.
Therefore the approximate change in social welfare brought by the menu of lotteries be-
comes
1
2
 r∗∫
rinf
α(r) ([1−G(r∗)]r∗ − r) dG(r)−G(r∗)r∗
rsup∫
r∗
α(r) dG(r)
 v.
Since v > 0, a suﬃcient condition for a local improvement upon the Lerner optimum is
that the expression that multiplies v be positive for some r∗, i.e.,
r∗
r∗∫
rinf
α(r) dG(r)− r∗G(r∗) >
r∗∫
rinf
α(r)r dG(r).
Since this inequality cannot be satisﬁed when r∗G(r∗) = 0, we have
Lemma 2. A suﬃcient condition for a random redistribution of income to improve upon
the Lerner deterministic outcome is that there is some r∗ > 0, G(r∗) > 0, such that
r∗∫
rinf
α(r)
dG(r)
G(r∗)
− 1 >
r∗∫
rinf
α(r)
r
r∗
dG(r)
G(r∗)
. (10)
9
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The left-hand side of (10) is the diﬀerence between the average social value of giving
one unit of money to each individual whose risk aversion is less than r∗ and the average
social value of such a gift to every one (the size of the population is normalized to 1).
This diﬀerence is positive when individuals with risk aversion smaller than r∗ have a higher
social value than the others.
The right-hand side of (10) depends on the shape of the left tail of the risk aversion
distribution. The social welfare loss from randomness comes entirely from utility losses of
the less risk averse individuals, who support the risk. These losses are proportional to their
risk aversions r, r ≤ r∗, and weighted by their social values.
When all the individuals with a risk aversion less than r∗ are risk neutral (r = 0 for
r < r∗), the right-hand side of (10) is equal to 0, so that randomization is useful whenever
the social weight of the risk neutral agents is larger than 1.
Remark 1 (Background risk). Lemma 2 extends to the case where the agents are endowed
with an initial random income y(θ), instead of the deterministic Lerner outcome y. The
government proposes a menu of lotteries y˜(θ) before incomes are realized. Suppose that
the lotteries are constrained to be independent of the initial income y(θ). Formula (10)
then is valid with
r(θ) = −Eu
′′(y(θ), θ)
Eu′(y(θ), θ)
, α(θ) = Eu′(y(θ), θ).
A necessary condition for a random income distribution y(θ) to be globally optimal is
therefore that (10) be not satisﬁed for this menu.
5 A necessary condition
Although (10) has been obtained from a special reform with individuals bunching on two
lotteries only, this section shows that it is also necessary for an improvement. This yields
the main result of our paper.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the small proﬁle (y˜(θ)) yields a choice of lotteries which only
depends on r and satisﬁes the monotonicity properties of Lemma 1. Then there exists r∗,
with G(r∗) > 0, such that (10) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for (y˜(θ)) to increase
social welfare upon the Lerner optimum.
Proof. We already know that (10) is a suﬃcient condition for (y˜(θ)) to increase social
welfare upon the Lerner optimum. It remains to show that it is also necessary. By Lemma
1, m(r) and v(r) are monotonic functions. They are therefore diﬀerentiable in r almost
everywhere, and integrable on
[
rinf , rsup
]
. From the last statement of Lemma 1, we see
that at any point where both m and v are diﬀerentiable functions of r incentive constraints
require that m′(r)− rv′(r)/2 = 0. Integrating this ﬁrst-order condition yields
m(r) = m(rinf) +
r∫
rinf
z
2
v′(z) dz.
10
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From the feasibility constraint, one gets
m(rinf) = −
rsup∫
rinf
 r∫
rinf
z
2
v′(z) dz
 dG(r) = rsup∫
rinf
[1−G(z)] z
2
v′(z) dz.
Hence,
m(r) =
r∫
rinf
z
2
v′(z) dz −
rsup∫
rinf
[1−G(z)] z
2
v′(z) dz.
Reintroducing this expression for the proﬁle (m(r)) into the change in the social objec-
tive (9), one gets at the ﬁrst-order in λ following the proof of Lemma 1
rsup∫
rinf
α(r)
 r∫
rinf
z
2
v′(z)dz
 dG(r)− rsup∫
rinf
[1−G(z)] z
2
v′(z) dz −
rsup∫
rinf
α(r)
r
2
v(r) dG(r).
Integration by parts yields
rsup∫
rinf
α(r)
 r∫
rinf
z
2
v′(z)dz
 dG(r) = rsup∫
rinf
1− r∫
rinf
α(z)dG(z)
 r
2
v′(r) dr
and, using v(rsup) = 0,
rsup∫
rinf
α(r)
r
2
v(r) dG(r) = −
rsup∫
rinf
 r∫
rinf
α(z)
z
2
dG(z)
 v′(r) dr.
Therefore the change in the social objective rewrites
rsup∫
rinf
r
2
G(r)− r∫
rinf
α(z) dG(z)
+ r∫
rinf
α(z)
z
2
dG(z)
 v′(r) dr.
By Lemma 1 incentive constraints imply v′(r) ≤ 0 for almost all r ∈ [rinf , rsup]. If there is
a proﬁle (m(r), v(r)) improving upon the Lerner optimum, it must be thatG(r)− r∫
rinf
α(z) dG(z)
 r
2
+
r∫
rinf
α(z)
z
2
dG(z) < 0
for some r. For r such that G(r) = 0, the above inequality cannot be satisﬁed. It follows
that there is some r such that1− r∫
rinf
α(z)
dG(z)
G(r)
 r
2
+
r∫
rinf
α(z)
z
2
dG(z)
G(r)
< 0.
11
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This is (10) with r = r∗. 
The work that is the closest to ours in the literature is that of Pestieau, Possen, and
Slutsky (2002), which addresses the same broad concern: when is it possible to improve
on the Lerner optimum with randomization? They ﬁnd in their Theorem 3A that for local
randomization to be socially useful in a two-type economy, the social planner must put a
higher weight on the type with the least risk aversion.2 Their argument proceeds as follows,
supposing for simplicity an equal number of agents of each type. Assume that there exist
two lotteries y˜(θ1) and y˜(θ2) satisfying feasibility and incentive constraints. Feasibility
implies that m(θ1) = −m(θ2). When the support of each lottery is close to 0 a ﬁrst-order
Taylor expansion shows that the social objective is higher than in the Lerner optimum
when α(θ1)m(θ1) + α(θ2)m(θ2) > 0. The incentive constraints imply m(θ1) > 0 and yield
α(θ1)− α(θ2) > 0.
This is to be compared with our expression for (10), which in this setup takes the form
α(θ1)− α(θ2) ≥ 2α(θ1)r(θ1)
r(θ2)
.
Since the right hand side of the above inequality is positive, Proposition 1 conﬁrms the
validity of Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky (2002). Our method of proof allows for an explicit
treatment of the agents risk aversion and yields a more precise bound, giving a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for useful local randomization of income transfers.
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